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Abstract 
Debt-induced crises, including the subprime, are usually attributed exclusively to supply-side 
factors. We examine the role of social influences on debt culture, emanating from perceived 
average income of peers. Utilizing unique information from a household survey 
representative of the Dutch population, that circumvents the issue of defining the social 
circle, we consider collateralized, consumer, and informal loans. We find robust social effects 
on borrowing, especially among those who consider themselves poorer than their peers; and 
on indebtedness, suggesting a link to financial distress. We employ a number of approaches 
to rule out spurious associations and to handle correlated effects.  
 
 
 
JEL Classifications:  G11, E21 
 
Keywords:  Household Finance, Household Debt, Social Interactions, Mortgages, 
Consumer Credit, Informal Loans  
 
2 
1.  Introduction 
The recent financial crisis has demonstrated the potential of sizeable household 
groups to borrow at levels that expose them to subsequent difficulties in servicing debts and 
to a non-trivial risk of default. For example, many US households had exposed themselves to 
excessive mortgage debt prior to the subprime crisis, and some ended up with negative equity 
following  the  reversal of historical house price trends. Existing literature  and public 
discussion  have  paid  attention,  almost exclusively,  to  supply-side factors that may have 
contributed to this tendency, such as lax standards of the banking sector, the transfer of risks, 
and the resulting lack of discipline in applying sound banking standards.
1
Much less attention has been devoted to understanding  demand-side  factors that 
contribute  to the spread of debt culture, especially among households who perceive 
themselves as having fewer resources than their peers on average. An important example of 
such factors, albeit specific to the subprime crisis, is the subjective belief of borrowers that 
US house prices could not fall, based on the long historical experience of price increases.
 
2
The importance of relative standing in the social circle has long been recognized in 
the economics and finance literature, but for issues other than debt.  Models with 
 
Our paper focuses on another factor, which could apply to all types of debt and has been 
explored only in other contexts: comparison with peers. If expectations or perceptions of 
relative standing are important for debt behavior, then regulation and monitoring of financial 
institutions may need to be combined with measures for households, such as financial 
education, proper advice, and appropriate default options, in order to contain the spread of 
debt culture and the risks for future debt-induced financial crises. 
                                                 
1 See for example, Mian and Sufi (2009) who show that a shift in credit supply was a key factor in the expansion 
of subprime mortgages in the US; and Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2012) who find that the quality of such 
loans deteriorated for six consecutive years prior to the crisis. Using recently available data, Christelis, 
Georgarakos and Haliassos (forthcoming) show that shortly prior to the recent crisis, outstanding mortgages 
were substantially larger among older US households than their European counterparts with similar resources 
and characteristics.  
2 See, for example, the contributions by Case (2012), Shiller (2012), and Smith (2012).  
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interdependent preferences have been applied to consumption (Duesenberry, 1949; Abel, 
1990; Gali, 1994, Kapteyn et al., 2011);  asset pricing  (Campbell and Cochrane, 1999); 
investing in assets  (Duflo and Saez, 2002; Hong, Kubik and Stein, 2004;  Kaustia and 
Knüpfer, forthcoming); supply of labor (Neumark and Postlewaite, 1998); work effort (Cohn 
et al., 2011); and short-run stabilization policy (Ljungqvist and Uhlig, 2000). To the best of 
our knowledge, this is the first paper that investigates the role of social interactions and 
comparison effects for borrowing behavior. 
Our paper exploits unique features of a population-wide survey to uncover a 
statistically and economically significant influence  of perceived relative standing on 
household  debt behavior.  Specifically, we  employ  data from  the  population-wide  Dutch 
National  Bank  (DNB)  Survey, and consider three different types of debt, namely 
collateralized loans, consumer non-collateralized loans, as well as informal loans from the 
social circle.  
We find that the higher the average income in the social circle, as perceived by a 
household,  the more this household  tends  to borrow, controlling for own demographics, 
resources, and other factors that typically determine borrowing needs. Estimated effects are 
sizeable both for collateralized and consumer debt. A 1,000 euro increase in the monthly 
household income of the peers is estimated to  raise  by 10 percent (7 percent) the 
unconditional likelihood of having collateralized (uncollateralized consumer)  loans, 
respectively.  Moreover, the influence of peer income on debt behavior is stronger among 
those who perceive their income to be below average for their social circle. Interestingly, 
higher perceived income of peers is associated not only with more borrowing but also with 
measures of household financial debt burden. As we discuss in detail later, we undertake a 
number of steps to rule out uninteresting alternative explanations of the relationship and to 
address the potential for a spurious correlation between the two due to similarity in  
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unobserved characteristics of the respondent or its environment with those of the peers. These 
latter  steps include estimation of different instrumental variable regression models and 
application of placebo tests.  
  Uncovering effects of social interactions on borrowing behavior poses some special 
challenges, not necessarily present in other domains. First, information about characteristics 
of the social circle is not typically available in most wealth surveys, as they are subject to a 
high degree of anonymization, intended  to prevent identity  disclosure.  Anonymization 
involves  omitting or heavily restricting information on location in regions, let alone 
neighborhoods. Faced with this challenge, research on social interactions on the asset side 
attempts to identify peer effects by constructing hypothesized social circles based on sorting 
assumptions (e.g., age and education); or  by  focusing  on specific financial products and 
social groups where interactions are visible (e.g.,  retirement plans in particular 
establishments); or by considering the frequency of meetings, where presumably assets (but 
typically not debts) are discussed or displayed.  
The DNB Survey  contains unique information that allows us to overcome this 
limitation. The survey asks respondents to describe key features of their social circle (e.g., 
age, education, occupation) and importantly the perceived average income of their peers. 
Moreover, the data offer information on the entire range of household debts, formal and 
informal, collateralized and unsecured, as well as on financial and real assets, as opposed to a 
single financial product. Finally, the survey is representative of the entire Dutch population, 
as opposed to a particular group.  
An additional challenge is that, while households may derive some pleasure from 
revealing their wages, consumption or asset levels to their social circle (or may be unable to 
hide them), they tend to be quite averse to revealing debt levels, protected also by bank 
confidentiality. Thus, the important channel through which peer effects are likely to operate  
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is  not  direct observation and emulation of borrowing behavior among peers,  but rather 
observation of some key determinant of such behavior (e.g., a measure of resources or ability 
to spend). In this context, we investigate the link between average peer income, as perceived 
by respondents, and the respondents’ own borrowing behavior.   
Our paper relates closely to three different strands of literature: effects of social 
interactions on asset choices; the relative income hypothesis and external habits; and finally, 
the literature on ‘envy versus ambition’.    
Duflo and Saez (2002) study  library  staff members in  different libraries of a big 
American university and show that individual participation in retirement investment plans is 
influenced by participation choices of colleagues. Such endogenous social effects could come 
from learning about assets or from discovering relevant social norms, but it is difficult to 
distinguish between these two. Hong, Kubik and Stein (2004) focus instead on sociability, 
and  show that the  more sociable in terms of certain self-reported metrics (i.e.,  frequent 
communication with neighbors and church-going) are more likely to own stocks.
3
The importance of peer income was stressed in the (cross-sectional) formulation of 
Duesenberry’s (1949) relative income hypothesis, built on insights in Veblen (1899) and 
Smith (1759). According to this hypothesis, households with incomes below average in their 
social circle will tend to consume a larger share of their income to keep up with peers. In 
modern analysis of  consumption and asset pricing, a fine distinction was made between 
dependence on contemporaneous average peer consumption (‘keeping up with the Joneses’) 
and lagged average consumption (‘catching up with the Joneses’).
  
4
                                                 
3 Brown et al. (2008) identify a causal influence of sociability on stockholding by instrumenting the average 
stock ownership of an individual’s community with past average ownership of the US states in which the 
individual’s non-native neighbors were born. Georgarakos and Pasini (2011) document effects of sociability on 
stockholding in Europe. 
 Recently, Kapteyn et al. 
(2011) have examined the effects on consumption of winning a Dutch postal code lottery, 
4 More recently, Roussanov (2010) built a model of status, where utility is a function of relative wealth and 
households are characterized by a desire to ‘get ahead of the Joneses’, focusing on private business ownership.  
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both among lottery winners and among their neighbors. Using specially collected survey data 
on expenditures and different assumptions on the social circle, the authors find that 
exogenous variations in income due to winning the lottery tend to influence durables 
purchases by winners but also the probability that neighbors will buy a new car. Their survey 
did not collect any information on debts or on perceptions of participants regarding their 
peers. 
It should be stressed that the research question of social influences on debt is distinct 
from the one relating to consumption: even if concern with relative standing leads to greater 
consumption, it may not necessarily lead to a greater tendency to borrow. For instance, if 
households increase labor supply, relative income concerns can increase both consumption 
and saving. Indeed, Neumark and Postlewaite (1998) found that married women in the US are 
16 to 25 percent more likely to work outside the home if their sisters’ husbands earn more 
than their own husbands. Even a positive labor supply response, however, could imply either 
more or less saving/ borrowing.
5
A third strand of literature has studied the link between relative income and self-
reported happiness or general well-being.  Relative income could  measure relative 
deprivation,  or create anticipatory feelings because lower-income households use it  as a 
signal of the (higher) income they, too, can earn in the future. A number of studies have 
found that individual subjective well-being is negatively influenced by others’ income
  
6
                                                 
5  Most existing theoretical models, based on an infinite-horizon representative agent, imply greater 
consumption, less leisure, and greater accumulation of assets, in order to keep up with the Joneses also in the 
future (Liu and Turnovsky, 2005). By contrast, Alvarez-Cuadrado and Van Long (2008) obtain less leisure but 
also lower saving when they consider overlapping generations in an infinite-horizon economy. 
, while 
utility-enhancing ‘anticipatory feelings’ (Caplin and Leahy, 2001)  have been stressed by 
Hirschmann and Rothschild (1973), who dubbed them ‘Tunnel Effect’. The idea is that, if 
6 For example, Clark and Oswald (1996) show that a worker’s job satisfaction is negatively influenced by the 
income earned by other individuals in her reference group. Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005) using German panel data 
finds that individuals tend to be better-off the larger their income is in comparison with the income of their 
acquaintances.  
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you are caught in a traffic jam in a tunnel and you see the other lane moving, you anticipate 
that you will also move soon.
7
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the unique features 
of our data set. Section 3 discusses possible channels through which peers might influence 
borrowing behavior, and  the  econometric approach  to  address  a number of challenges. 
Section 4 presents the main results on the relationship between perceived income of peers and 
own  debt behavior, including endogeneity tests and IV estimates. Section 5 presents 
additional robustness checks and placebo tests. Section 6 presents evidence of asymmetric 
effects on borrowing across households poorer and richer than the peer average and inspects 
likely channels through which peer income operates. Section 7 concludes. 
 The effect on borrowing may, in the end, be positive, either 
when households are disappointed by their current relative income or when they expect a 
positive income growth rate.  
 
2.  The Data 
The DNB Survey is a unique data set that allows the study of both psychological and 
economic aspects of financial behavior.  The survey was launched in 1993 and includes 
information on work, pensions, housing, mortgages, income, assets, consumer loans, health, 
economic and psychological concepts, and personal characteristics. The initial survey 
consists of around 2,790 Dutch households that are oversampled from the top-10% of the 
income distribution and (with the use of survey weights) is representative of the Dutch-
speaking population. Households have been re-interviewed each following year, but given the 
length of the panel, attrition was non-negligible. In order to keep the cross section sample 
representative, new households have been added each year, with a major refreshing in 2001, 
                                                 
7 Senik (2004) finds empirical support for the ‘Tunnel Effect’ using survey data from Russia, while Senik 
(2008) documents a negative comparison income effect in many ‘old’ European countries, and a positive one 
(i.e., consistent with a ‘Tunnel Effect’) in East European countries and the US, mainly linked to the degree of 
income mobility.  
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resulting in a sample of 1,861 households. In view of this significant refreshing, we pool data 
only  from  waves between 2001  until 2008,  which  cover a period of relatively stable 
employment rates and increasing housing prices
8
The survey includes an extensive questionnaire covering income, real and financial 
wealth holdings. Debt related questions allow us to distinguish between collateralized and 
non-collateralized debt as well as loans from friends and relatives. In what follows, we will 
mainly  focus on  consumer debt and collateralized  debt, but we also present results on 
informal loans (from friends and relatives).  
, and we employ survey weights to account 
for  the  over-representation  of the wealthy.  After excluding households with incomplete 
questionnaires or missing information on the characteristics of their social circle, the sample 
used in the baseline estimations consists of roughly 4,500 households.  
Table 1 provides summary statistics on the prevalence and the amounts outstanding 
among debt holders by survey year and by loan type. Reported statistics suggest relatively 
stable prevalence of all three types of loans over the years we examine. Collateralized debts 
account for most of household borrowing. They are held by roughly 40% of households and 
the median conditional outstanding amount is about 98,000 euro. One out of five Dutch 
households has consumer loans with a median outstanding amount of roughly 4,000 euro. On 
the other hand, 4% report loans from friends and relatives, while almost 28% report that they 
can borrow from friends in the future.  
A unique feature of the Dutch survey, most relevant for our purposes in this paper, is 
that individuals are asked to report explicitly a number of characteristics of the people with 
whom they “associate frequently, such as friends, neighbors, acquaintances, or maybe people 
at work”. In particular, respondents report their perception of the average annual total net 
household income among people in their social circle. Answers are recorded in one out of 
                                                 
8 Unemployment rates in the Netherlands reach a minimum of 3% in 2008, while they increase to 3.7% and 
4.5% in 2009 and 2010, respectively. National housing prices increase on average by roughly 2% each year up 
to 2008, while they decline by 2.8% in 2009 and by 3.4% in 2010.  
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eleven income brackets (details are provided in the appendix). Respondents also report the 
age category most members of their social circle belong to, the average household size, the 
average education,  the most prevalent kind of employment in their social circle, and the 
average hours of work per week among peers, distinguished by gender.  
Furthermore, the survey asks direct questions about the respondent’s interactions with 
peers through financial information exchange or through informal borrowing; perceptions of 
the spending ability of the social circle; and expectations regarding future own income. This 
information is used below to shed light on the process through which social interactions 
influence borrowing behavior.  
 
3.  Effects of the Social Circle on Debt Behavior 
3.1  Possible Channels 
Asset market participation and holdings of peers may influence any member of the 
peer group via direct observation of financial behavior, information sharing, and 
dissemination of social norms. Peer effects in borrowing behavior, however, are much less 
likely to emanate from direct observation of the loans of peers or even from discussions with 
them regarding their indebtedness. Unlike assets, loans are not directly observable to third 
parties and can only become known to them if the borrowers decide to reveal them. 
Borrowers, on the other hand, are less likely to want to discuss their loans, because of 
embarrassment or shame, than to exhibit their assets.
9
Still, financial advice and consultation with members of the social circle may inform 
households about the process of getting formal or informal loans, and/or about the social 
norms regarding borrowing; and may even deliver informal loans from the social circle. Our 
  
                                                 
9 Such considerations have been shown to be important even in countries with underdeveloped credit markets, 
where informal borrowing is quite widespread. For example, Collins, et al. (2009), using data from Bangladesh, 
India, and South Africa, find that many indebted households feel ashamed asking relatives for additional credit 
or they do not wish to reveal their financial situation to close acquaintances.  
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data allow us to identify households that consult with their family, friends, and acquaintances 
regarding financial decisions and to take  into account explicitly this  possible  channel  of 
effects. 
Households that do not consult with their social circle regarding financial matters may 
still be influenced by observable behavior of that circle in their decision on whether to take 
out a loan and how much to borrow. Through social  interaction, households  form  a 
perception of the average disposable income of their acquaintances. This could come from a 
variety of sources, ranging from direct knowledge of pay scales for acquaintances at work to 
open discussions with friends and family, but also to inference  of income levels from 
observed spending or asset accumulation patterns.
10
It is conceivable that perceptions  of higher peer income  contribute positively to 
borrowing through at least three channels: trying to emulate the spending or living standards 
of acquaintances (a comparison effect); inferring that more can be borrowed directly from 
them  in the future;  and inferring that future own income is  likely to move in the same 
direction as has current income of the social circle (an expectations or ‘Tunnel’ effect). Our 
survey allows us to take into account the second channel, by asking households directly 
whether they are in a position to borrow a significant amount of money from their friends and 
relatives; and the third, by asking them to state their expectations about future own income.  
 As discussed, a key feature of our dataset 
is that it asks respondents directly about the perceived average income of their acquaintances 
allowing us to assess its influence on own borrowing behavior.  
With reference to the first channel,  spending behavior or visible accumulation of 
assets (such as housing) by members of the social circle may well induce a household to 
borrow in order to match it (or exceed it). Our data allow us to observe perceptions regarding 
spending ability of peers and to incorporate them in the econometric analysis. Although 
                                                 
10 Indeed, imputation of incomes on the basis of spending items or asset accumulation is sometimes used by tax 
authorities to fight tax evasion in countries in which such phenomena are widespread.  
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perceptions regarding housing or living standards of peers are not directly available, we 
examine their relevance by imputing them based on data reported by households likely to be 
considered by the respondents as peers or as sharing key characteristics with them. 
  
3.2  Econometric Specification 
 In the benchmark specification, we examine whether the tendency of households to 
borrow and the size of loans conditional on borrowing are influenced by the average income 
that they perceive their peer group to have. Specifically, respondents are asked the following 
question: “If you think of your circle of acquaintances, how much do you think is the average 
total net income per year of those households?” The possible answers come in brackets. In 
our reported results, we use the mid points of these bands, adjusted for inflation, while in the 
appendix we provide details on  a number of robustness checks that employ  different 
specifications of this variable.
11
Existing literature on social interactions in consumption or asset holdings has focused 
on uncovering what Manski (1993) termed ‘endogenous social effects’, namely direct effects 
of observing the behavior of others, such as consumption or asset holdings, on own 
behavior.
 
12
Given that debts are typically not observable by members of the social circle (for 
various reasons, discussed above), our primary focus is on uncovering ‘exogenous or 
contextual effects’. These are influences on debt behavior that emanate from observing (or 
forming perceptions) regarding not debts, but key characteristics of peers relevant for debt 
 Econometric modeling in this setup has to address the ‘reflection problem’ that 
naturally arises when the behavior of households in a group is expressed as a function of the 
average behavior of the group that includes them.  
                                                 
11 We have experimented with dummy variables for income bands, and with a flag dummy variable for those 
answering ‘don’t know’, but results are insensitive to these variations. 
12 See Durlauf and Ioannides (2010) for a thorough review of methodological issues in social interaction models.  
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behavior, such as peers’ incomes. In this setup the two major challenges are: (i) to rule out 
spurious links between peer income and own borrowing behavior that have little to do with a 
comparison effect; and (ii) to rule out correlated effects, i.e. an association between own 
borrowing and peer income, arising  from similarity in unobserved characteristics of the 
respondent or the respondent’s environment with those of peers.  
 In our regressions, we control separately for non linear effects of household resources 
in the form of net income, net financial wealth, and net real wealth as well as for net income 
of the peers.
13
 A standard but uninteresting source of an effect of higher perceived income of peers 
on own borrowing could be related to an adverse idiosyncratic shock: controlling for own 
income, the higher the perceived average income of peers, the greater the chance that the 
household has experienced a bad idiosyncratic shock in this period. In such a case, standard 
models would prescribe more borrowing to smooth an adverse transitory shock. We control 
for this possibility by including in the regression self-reported health, labor market status 
dummies, and especially answers to a direct question on whether last year’s income was 
‘unusually low’.  
 In addition, we take into account age (through a second order polynomial), 
gender, and educational attainment of the financial respondent as well as marital status and 
number of children.  
 Another possibility is that the respondent’s perception of higher income in the social 
circle partly reflects a macro or a regional shock: perceptions improve simply because the 
macro-economy performs better or because the region in which most of the social circle is 
located does so. We take into account these two channels in a flexible way by including both 
year and region fixed effects in all our specifications.  
                                                 
13 We allow for non linear effects of household net income, financial and real wealth, and net income of peers 
(which all  have skewed distributions)  by means of  the inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS)  transformation (i.e., 
log(x+(x
2+1)
1/2). The advantage of this, near-logarithmic transformation, is that  it  is defined for zero and 
negative values (see also Pence, 2006). Our results are robust to alternative specifications of the aforementioned 
covariates (e.g., dummies denoting quartiles).  
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 The more involved potential channel whereby a positive association between peer 
income and borrowing could be generated is the one associated with correlated effects: there 
may be unobserved factors that influence both the desire to borrow and the desire to associate 
with high-income peers and acquaintances. In the case of informal loans, the link could be 
very direct: respondents would be more likely to associate with high-income  peers  and 
relatives in order to borrow from them. In the case of formal loans, the link could be subtler. 
For any given need to borrow, higher income friends would be able to provide more informal 
loans, reducing the need for formal ones. However, it may also be that unobserved factors 
make respondents more likely to borrow using any type of loan, and at the same time 
encourage them to associate with peers  that are viewed as wealthy and in a position  to 
provide informal loans. In this case, a spurious positive relationship between peer incomes 
and all types of loans might be generated.  
 One approach to address such problems of correlated effects is instrumental variable 
estimation. Instruments should be correlated with the covariate of interest (i.e., perceived 
average income of the social circle), and their effects on borrowing should run through peer 
income but not through other unobserved factors.   
We  use  two  independent sets  of  instruments  that  hinge on  different identification 
assumptions. First, we exploit variation in local labor market conditions and the asymmetric 
effects that these can  have for the incomes of households with different educational 
background. That is, a given difference in educational attainment between the respondent and 
her peers can imply a bigger difference in incomes in regions with better conditions for the 
highly educated workers. Specifically, we interact regional employment rates in high-tech 
sectors with the difference in educational attainment between each respondent and her peers, 
while we control for the respondent’s own educational attainment and occupation status, as  
 
14 
well as for region fixed effects.
14
 The second IV strategy follows the recent approach in network literature that exploits 
variation in characteristics of members of the social circle, not immediately linked to the 
decision maker (De Giorgi, Frederiksen and Pistaferri, 2011). In our data, members of a 
couple are asked separately to report the characteristics of their social circles, while we can 
distinguish in addition the person who ultimately makes the financial decisions. Thus, we use 
as an instrument for the financial decision maker’s perceptions of his or her income of peers 
the characteristics of the partner’s social circle, as reported by that partner. The idea is that 
the partner forms an estimate of  average income in the social circle based on the 
characteristics of his/her own acquaintances (age and education), and this in turn influences 
the perception of the financial  decision maker regarding average income in the decision 
maker’s social circle. Such influence could be exerted either because the partner provides a 
fresh perspective and more information to the financial decision maker or because the partner 
exerts pressure and manages to alter the perceptions of the financial decision maker, even in 
ways that are not objectively accurate.  
 The identification assumption is that the educational gap 
between the respondent and her peers will raise the respondent’s perception of her peers’ 
average income, and more so when the regional employment share in high technology 
occupations, for which education matters a lot, is larger. Indeed results from the auxiliary 
regressions (presented in the Appendix, Table D.1, cols. 1, 2, 3) suggest a strong positive 
association between our instrument and the perceived income of the peers. 
                                                 
14  High tech-sectors refer to both high-tech manufacturing industries (manufacture of basic pharmaceutical 
products and pharmaceutical preparations computer, electronic and optical products) and high-tech knowledge-
intensive services (motion picture, video and television programs  production, sound recording and music 
publishing activities; programming and broadcasting activities; telecommunications; computer programming; 
consultancy and related activities; information service activities; scientific research and development). We 
calculate employment rates in high-tech sectors across all Dutch provinces, namely: Groningen,  Friesland, 
Drenthe, Overijssel, Flevoland, Gelderland, Utrecht, Noord-Holland, Zuid-Holland, Zeeland, Noord-Brabant, 
and Limburg.  
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 In order to employ this instrument, we have to restrict the sample to couples. We take 
a cautious stance by considering only households for  which the characteristics  of peers 
reported differ among the financial decision maker and the partner. This may be due to small 
overlap between the social circles of the two partners, or to differences in perceptions of 
peers between them. Results from auxiliary regressions are presented in the Appendix (Table 
D.1, cols. 4, 5, 6). Given that we utilize  two instruments  (age and education)  for one 
potentially endogenous covariate, we can assess their validity using a Sargan-Hansen test for 
over-identifying restrictions. As we show in the next section we fail to reject the null that the 
employed instruments are valid in all specifications used to model collateralized and 
consumer loans.  
 
4.  Results on the Role of Peer Income for Borrowing Behavior 
We estimate a series of probit and tobit models, modeling the likelihood of having 
loans and the (log) amount of loans outstanding, respectively. Standard errors have been 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity,  allowing for clustering at the household level. To  gain 
understanding of the economic significance  of our findings,  we report average marginal 
effects for the probit models; and average marginal effects conditional on having the loan 
type under examination for the tobit models. We apply the two sets of instruments described 
above to all three different types of loans we consider: informal loans, collateralized formal 
loans, and consumer (uncollateralized) formal loans.  
Table 2 (col. 1) presents average marginal effects from a probit regression modeling 
the probability that the respondent thinks that he/she can borrow from friends or relatives in 
the future, if needed. The estimated marginal effect of the perceived average income of the 
social circle is positive and significant at 1%. It implies that an assumed increase of the 
(perceived) annual household income of peers by 12,000 euro (i.e., 1,000 on a monthly basis)  
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is associated with a higher probability to declare that it is likely to borrow from the social 
circle in the future by 2.3 percentage points (pp). Both sets of instruments we employ are 
highly significant at 1% in auxiliary regressions, with F-tests well above 10. When we use 
either the first or the second set of instruments described above, we reject exogeneity at the 
1% confidence level. As a result, we report marginal effects and associated standard errors on 
peers’ income derived from two IV probit models.
15 In both cases, the estimated marginal 
effect is statistically significant and higher than the one derived under the simple probit 
model.
16
When we examine the probability that respondents currently have informal loans, we 
also estimate  a positive association with  average peer income  of the order of .8  pp 
(corresponding to an almost 20% increase in the unconditional probability of borrowing from 
friends), while we fail to reject the null of no endogeneity. Results from tobit regressions on 
outstanding informal loan amounts paint a similar picture. 
  
  Table 3 presents results for  collateralized formal loans. In  comparison  to the 
specification used for informal loans we additionally control for intentions to borrow from 
friends in the future and for whether the respondent gets financial advice from friends and 
relatives. We do not find any significant association between own borrowing behavior and 
these last two covariates. If anything, results suggest a negative association (significant at 
10% in the tobit specification) between getting advice from friends and outstanding levels of 
collateralized debt.  
                                                 
15 Given that the original model is nonlinear with one (potentially) endogenous covariate that is continuous, we 
use standard maximum likelihood routines that fit discrete choice models with one endogenous covariate (e.g., 
ivprobit in Stata). They produce consistent estimated coefficients and associated standard errors that are 
necessary for the computation of marginal effects. An alternative way to test and correct for endogenous 
covariates in non-linear regression models is the two-step procedure of Rivers and Vuong (1988), summarized 
in Wooldridge (2002, p. 473). We have applied the Rivers-Vuong procedure, using both sets of instruments in 
all our models presented in Tables 2, 3, and 4, and the results are entirely consistent to those we present. 
16 While F-tests are passed for both instruments, the second instrument strategy fails the overidentification test.  
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We estimate statistically significant effects  of the perceived average household 
income of the social circle (due to an assumed 12,000 euro annual increase) both on the 
likelihood to have a collateralized loan and on the (conditional) outstanding amount. The 
estimated marginal effect from probit is 4.4 pp, implying a more than 10% net contribution to 
the unconditional likelihood of having a mortgage. The estimated effect from tobit suggests a 
conditional elasticity of 0.5, corresponding roughly to a 15,500 euro increase in the amount 
borrowed by a typical household with collateralized debt.
17 According to all tests presented at 
the bottom of Table 3, we fail to reject the null of exogeneity of peer income, with p-values 
of the order of 15% - 17%. If one still estimates instrumental probit and tobit models, one 
derives qualitatively similar marginal effects using either set of instruments.
18
  Finally,  Table 4 presents estimates relating to formal, uncollateralized consumer 
loans. We estimate a positive marginal effect of peer income on the probability that consumer 
loans are taken of the order of 1.6 pp (i.e., contributing about 7% to the likelihood of having 
such loans). The corresponding elasticity of the size of consumer loan, conditional on 
participation, to peer income is of the order of 0.24, which implies an increase of 
approximately 380 euro to the amount borrowed by a typical borrower.
  
19
                                                 
17 The calculation is based on conditional medians of collateralized debt (98,000 euro) and of peers’ income 
(34,500 euro) among households with collateral loans outstanding. 
 Using either set of 
instruments we decisively fail to reject the null of exogeneity of income of peers in both 
probit and tobit models.  Interestingly, getting financial advice from the social circle is 
negatively related to obtaining a consumer loan and to borrowing larger amounts conditional 
on obtaining the loan. It seems that financial advice from peers, instead of providing 
knowhow on how to obtain a formal consumer loan, tends to discourage respondents from 
obtaining such loans.   
18 The estimated marginal effects (p-values) from the instrumental variable probit models using the first and 
second set of instruments are 8.7 pp (.003) and 12 pp (.016), respectively. The corresponding estimated 
conditional elasticities from the instrumental variable tobit models are: .94 (.004) and 1.37 (.051). 
19 Based on conditional medians of uncollateralized debt (4,000 euro) and of peers’ income (26,000 euro) 
among households with consumer loans.  
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5.  Further Robustness and Placebo Tests 
In what follows we investigate  further  the issue of  endogenous peer income, 
exploiting the richness of the data rather than specific instruments and formal endogeneity 
tests. First, we consider the possibility that there are unobserved factors that systematically 
influence both the propensity to borrow and the association with more affluent peers. In such 
a case, it seems plausible that the perceived income of peers would have a stronger effect on 
borrowing among those who obtain financial advice from friends and/ or plan to borrow from 
them in the future. Respondents are asked precisely whether they obtain advice or plan to 
borrow from their peers, and their responses can be used to examine this possibility for 
formal loans.  
We have re-estimated the models presented in Tables 3 and 4, introducing interaction 
terms between peer income and two dummies, representing households who obtain financial 
advice from friends and those who state that can borrow from friends in the future. In all 
models these two interaction terms were jointly insignificant. 
Another approach to investigating the potential relevance of unobserved factors for 
the income of peers is to take into account the entire set of characteristics of peers asked in 
the survey. We have thus re-estimated the baseline models for formal loans (presented in 
Tables 3 and 4) including as additional covariates the age, education, household size, and 
employment status of the social circle. In all cases, the estimated effects on peer income in 
terms of magnitude, sign,  and significance remained unchanged, while the additional 
characteristics of the social circle were mostly statistically insignificant.  
  A further possibility we want to guard against is that there are unobserved factors 
which influence both incomes and borrowing choices of people of similar age, education, and 
gender,  and that these produce a spurious association  between peer income and own 
borrowing. In order to rule out this possibility, we conduct a series of placebo tests for formal  
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loans. The idea is that, if such factors were important, then they would operate for any social 
circle sharing those characteristics and not only for the specific social circle of the 
respondent. To conduct the placebo test, we construct cells based on the interview year, age, 
education, and gender of participants; and we assign to each respondent in a given cell the 
acquaintances of another, randomly selected, respondent in that same cell.  
  Results from these placebo regressions for formal loans are summarized in Table 5. 
Unlike the income of the actual social circle of the respondent, the randomly assigned 
incomes of acquaintances are highly  insignificant  across all specifications (with p-values 
greater than .25 and in most of the cases well above .5). We have performed additional 
placebo tests based on cell  construction  that  utilizes  various combinations of the 
aforementioned  traits and/ or regions that households live in.  In all cases,  we  failed to 
estimate any significant effects on the (randomly assigned) incomes of acquaintances. Results 
from these placebo tests further support the view that the observed effects of average peer 
income  reflect comparison effects rather than an artifact of  the configuration of 
characteristics of social groups. 
 
6.  Inspecting the Nature of the Effects of Peer Income 
  It is plausible to suppose that effects of perceptions regarding the income of the social 
circle on loan behavior would depend on whether the own income is above or below that 
perceived level. In other words, we would expect that people who perceive themselves as 
being poorer than their peers would tend to be more responsive to changes in peer income 
than those who feel richer than their peers. We  allow for such asymmetry by taking 
differences of own income from income of peers. That is, we re-estimate our baseline models 
(presented in Tables 2, 3, and 4) replacing peers’ income with two terms denoting positive 
and negative differences between own and peers’ income.   
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  Results from this specification are presented in Table 6. For respondents who are 
poorer than what they perceive their acquaintances to be, an assumed increase in their social 
circle’s annual income of 12,000 euro (that raises the income gap relative to their peers), 
increases the probability to get a collateralized loan by 3.6 pp and a consumer loan by 1 pp. 
In fact, only effects referring to those who perceive themselves as being poorer than their 
social circle are statistically significant, be it with respect to participation or to conditional 
amounts.
20
Our results above suggest that the income of acquaintances and how it compares to 
the household’s own income tend to influence borrowing, not only from friends and family 
but also from the financial sector. The increased tendency to obtain consumer loans and to 
make them larger conditional on getting them is presumably aimed at boosting consumer 
spending. The corresponding tendency for collateralized loans arises from efforts to acquire 
collateral assets of higher value. We look next for evidence that at least part of the peer 
income effect comes from a comparison with the ability of peers to spend, on consumer 
goods or on collateral assets. 
  
  For this purpose, we use a direct survey question on whether respondents perceive 
their acquaintances as having ‘more money to spend’ than they do. Responses to this question 
are coded in a one-to-seven  ordinal  scale, ranging from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly 
agree’. This reference to ‘money to spend’ invites respondents to consider, in addition to 
incomes, also basic inelastic expenditure needs of their acquaintances (e.g., household size). 
The focus  on  others’  spending ability allows us to see whether the intensity of such a 
perception has an independent influence on own borrowing behavior. 
  Table  7 (panel B)  shows  results on the  ordinal  variable  denoting households’ 
agreement with the statement that ‘acquaintances have more money to spend than I’ which 
                                                 
20 The only exception regards the likelihood of borrowing from the social circle in the future, suggesting that 
households consider such a possibility even if their own income exceeds that of their peers and more so when 
their peers become richer, narrowing the income gap.   
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has been added to our baseline specification for non-collateralized consumer loans. In all 
cases, marginal effects are positive and statistically significant, both for participation and for 
conditional amounts.   
  In the case of collateral assets, such as the primary residence, ability of acquaintances 
to spend is indicated by the size and other observable attributes of the house they own. The 
dataset includes objective information on people’s homes, including  the size (in square 
meters) of the living room in the main residence. This size is readily observable to most of 
the social circle and  likely reflects the household’s standard of living and priorities in 
enjoying life.  
  As  there is no direct  information  in the data  on perceptions regarding the living 
arrangements of the social circle, we compute an average of square meters of the living room 
by age/education cells of the social circle of each respondent. We also take into account in 
the regression the square meters of the living room of the respondent, so that we estimate 
effects that are net of the respondent’s own living standards.  
  Results on the covariates of interest are presented in Table 7 (panel A). The 
constructed variable on the average size of living rooms of the social circle is positive and 
statistically significant  at 5%, both in the participation (probit) regression and in the 
conditional size of collateral loan (tobit) regression, controlling for the size of the 
respondent’s own living room.  
  All in all, our results with proxies that refer to direct comparisons with spending or 
assets of members of the social circle support the hypothesis that the tendency of households 
to participate in collateralized and uncollateralized loans is partly  influenced by such 
comparisons, controlling for the perceived average income of the social circle.  
In trying to probe further into the nature of the comparison effect of average peer 
income, we also examine whether part of the effect is linked to the ‘Tunnel Effect’ (i.e.,  
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likely to arise because higher peer income signals the potential for higher own income in the 
future). To that effect, we have also taken into account the respondent’s perception regarding 
the minimum possible income in the next year. We find that expectations about (minimum) 
income in the subsequent year has a positive and statistically significant coefficient in the 
regressions that model collateralized debt, supporting the presence of a ‘Tunnel Effect’ for 
this type of loans. 
In  sum, we estimate somewhat smaller, but still significant marginal effects of 
perceived average peer income on formal borrowing, even in the presence of such additional 
controls. This in turn suggests that the influence of peer income is not fully explained by a 
‘Tunnel Effect’. The remaining effects may well reflect some alternative considerations, like 
envy or concern about status, that are not fully captured by the proxies for comparison effects 
we have included in our regressions. 
  Finally, we examine the extent to which perceived income of the peers associates with 
measures of over-indebtedness. To this end, we regress loan-to-value ratios as well as debt-
service ratios on perceived average income of peers and on the rich array of socio-economic 
covariates used in our baseline specifications.  Average  marginal effects from tobit 
regressions  are presented in Table 8.  Our estimates imply that an assumed 12,000 euro 
increase in the perceived annual income of the peers, contributes 1.2 pp to an average loan-
to-value ratio of 18% and 0.3 pp to an average debt-service ratio of 6%. Endogeneity tests 
(summarized at the bottom of the table) show no evidence of endogenous peer income in 
either of the equations.
21
These findings suggest that the effect of social interactions we uncover is not confined 
to own borrowing behavior, but is also likely to have implications for financial distress. In the 
country and time period considered, there  was an  upward trend  in housing prices and 
 
                                                 
21 Calculations are a based on a median peer income of 33,000 euro.  
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relatively stable labor market conditions. Nevertheless, factors like perceived income of the 
peers that have induced additional borrowing during times of expansion could well turn into 
key determinants of distress during recessions. Indeed, if such reversals are present, it may be 
worthwhile to extend the logic of ‘Minsky moments’ to household borrowing, as well. 
 
7.  Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we use unique information  from the DNB Household Survey, 
representative of the Dutch population, in order to assess the effects of social interactions on 
the tendency to have debt of different types and on the size of loans conditional on having 
them. We exploit the directly elicited  perceptions of respondents regarding the  average 
income of their social circle and ability of their peers to spend. This circumvents the need to 
construct a  hypothesized social circle on the basis of arbitrary assumptions regarding 
characteristics of its members. 
We find that the higher the perceived income of the social circle is, the greater is the 
tendency of respondents to take up loans and borrow sizeable amounts. This is true both for 
uncollateralized (consumer) loans and for collateralized loans, controlling for a number of 
factors that include household own resources, whether the household obtains financial advice 
from its circle, and whether it thinks that it could borrow substantial amounts from them. The 
effect is stronger for those who perceive themselves as having lower income than their social 
circle.  
The tendency of households to take up  uncollateralized  and collateralized loans, 
controlling for the perceived average income of the social circle, is partly related to perceived 
spending ability or (computed) housing assets of members of the social circle. Moreover, we 
find that expectations about (the minimum) next period’s income are statistically significant 
for collateralized loans, pointing to a ‘Tunnel Effect’, but do not render perceived income of  
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the peers insignificant. This is consistent with the idea that borrowing behavior is influenced 
by peer income not only because it conveys some information regarding the respondent’s 
own future, but also because of some comparison or envy effect. Finally, the role of such 
comparisons is not confined to the tendency to borrow and to the level of borrowing 
conditional on participation, but it seems to extend also to financial distress.  
The potential for social influences on borrowing is considerable: by observing that 
others have higher average incomes, the household not only tries to emulate their spending, 
as other studies have found, but also decides to borrow more, only partly because of 
expectations of higher future own income. To the extent that such mechanisms are present, 
they can contribute to ‘Minsky moments’  that involve not only excessive borrowing by 
companies during booms, emphasized by Minsky,  but also excessive  borrowing by 
households. The policy implication of such findings is to interfere not with the process of 
forming social circles or perceptions regarding them, but rather with households inferring that 
income or spending differences with their  peers are  to  be  bridged through borrowing, 
especially when this is not supported by the economic fundamentals of the household.   
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Appendix A. Definitions of Variables and Summary Statistics 
 
Types of Debt: 
 
Ability to borrow from social circle. Yes to “Are you currently in a position to borrow a 
substantial sum of money from family or friends?” (LENEN=1) 
 
Loans from social circle: Loans from family and friends. 
 
Collateralized  loans: Debts on hire-purchase contracts;  debts  based on payment by 
installment; equity based loans; debts with mail-order firms; shops or other retail business; 
mortgages on main house, second house and other pieces of real estate. 
 
Outstanding uncollateralized debt: Private loans; extended lines of credit; study loans; credit 
card debts; other loans. 
 
Questions on characteristics of the social circle: 
 
The following questions concern your circle of acquaintances, that is, the people with whom 
you associate frequently, such as friends, neighbors, acquaintances, or maybe people at work. 
 
KENLTD. If you think of your circle of acquaintances, into which age category do MOST of 
these people go? Please select the answer that is closest to reality. Age (in years) is mostly: 
under 16; 16 – 20; 21 - 25; 26 - 30; 31 - 35; 36 - 40; 41 - 45; 46 - 50; 51 - 55; 56 - 60; 61 - 65; 
66 - 70; 71 or over. 
 
KENHH. The people in your circle of acquaintances may live alone or share a household 
with other people (for example with a partner and children). Of how many persons do MOST 
households of your acquaintances consist?  one person; two persons; three persons; four 
persons; five persons; six persons or more. 
 
KENINK. How much do you think is the AVERAGE total net income per year of those 
households? less than € 8,000 per year; € 8,000 – 9,500; € 9,500 – 11,000; € 11,000 – 13,000; 
€ 13,000 – 16,000; € 16,000 – 20,000; € 20,000 – 28,000; € 28,000 – 38,000; € 38,000 – 
50,000; € 50,000 – 75,000; € 75,000 or more; don’t know.  
 
KENOPL. Which level of education do MOST of your acquaintances have? primary 
education; junior vocational training; lower secondary education; secondary education/pre-
university education; senior vocational training; vocational colleges/first year university 
education; university education. 
 
KENWERK. What kind of employment do MOST of your acquaintances have? self-
employed; practicing a free profession; working in the family business; employed on a 
contractual basis; mostly no paid job. 
  
MANUUR (VROUWUUR). If you think of the MEN (WOMEN) among your acquaintances, 
how many hours per week do they work on average? 
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Other questions: 
 
Get financial advice from friends. When answering “parents, friends or acquaintances” to the 
following question: “What is your most important source of advice when you have to make 
important financial decisions for the household?” (ADVIES=1). 
 
Social circle has more money to spend than I. “Other people in my environment have more 
money to spend than I. Please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree” (SITUAT3: 
1.totally disagree…7.totally agree). 
 
Last year income: unusually low. “Is the income your household earned in the past 12 months 
unusually high or low compared to the income you would expect in a ‘regular’ year, or is it 
regular?” (INKNORM= 1.“Unusually low”). 
 
Perceived lower bound on next period’s income. “What do you expect to be the LOWEST 
total net monthly income your household may realize in the next 12 months? (HOOG). 
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Table A1. Summary statistics: various demographics 
 
 Note: Weighted statistics from waves 2001-2008 of DNB data.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Average Std. Dev. Number of 
Observations
Age 48.23 15.41 14,893
Male 0.53 0.50 14,892
Couple 0.64 0.48 14,893
Number of Children 0.64 1.03 14,893
Education dummies:
Less than high school 0.27 0.44 14,815
High School 0.34 0.48 14,815
College Degree 0.38 0.48 14,815
Other Education 0.01 0.11 14,815
Labour market status dummies:
Unemployed 0.02 0.14 14,889
Employed 0.54 0.50 14,889
Self employed 0.04 0.20 14,889
Retired 0.17 0.37 14,889
Other status 0.23 0.42 14,889
Last year income: unusually low 0.07 0.25 11,342
Health poor/ fair 0.28 0.45 11,791
Ability to borrow from soc. circle 0.28 0.45 8,782
Get financial advice from friends 0.34 0.47 11,454
Soc. circle has more money to spend than I 3.85 1.47 8,939
Own living room sq. meters 35.98 25.26 12,013
Avg living room sq. meters of friends 36.54 3.37 14,892
Loan-to-value ratio 0.18 0.30 13,081
Debt servicing ratio 0.06 0.15 10,215 
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Table A2. Summary statistics: various economic indicators 
 
Note: Weighted statistics from waves 2001-2008 of DNB data. Amounts refer to constant 2008 euro. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Average Std. Dev. 25th perc Median  75th perc
Number of 
obs
Avg. peer income 31,807 13,955 24,000 33,000 36,941 6,872
Net hh income 27,617 23,638 15,943 24,687 35,886 10,031
Net financial wealth 36,137 100,092 1,393 10,847 36,430 11,412
Net real wealth 102,417 179,408 0 11,913 163,576 13,245
Perceived lower bound on 
next period's income
17,500 36,683 2,134 14,434 26,387 11,049 
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Appendix B. Calculation of average marginal effects via Monte Carlo simulation 
 
Given that marginal effects are non-linear functions of the estimated parameters,  ˆ β  (either 
from probit or tobit models), we compute their point estimates and standard errors via Monte 
Carlo simulation (Train, 2003) by using the formula: 
 
β β β β d f g g E ) ( ) ( )) ( ( ∫ =  
 
where  () g β   denotes the magnitude of interest and  () f β the joint distribution of all the 
elements in β. We implement this simulation estimator by drawing 500 times from the joint 
distribution of the estimated vector of parameters  ˆ β   under the assumption that it is 
asymptotically normal with mean and variance-covariance matrix equal to the maximum 
likelihood estimates. Then, for a given parameter draw j  we generate the magnitude of 
interest  ˆ ()
j g β . We first calculate this magnitude for each household in our sample, and then 
calculate the average marginal  effect as the weighted average of the effect across all 
households in our sample, using survey weights.
22 ( ( )) Egβ  We then estimate  and its standard 
error as the mean and standard deviation, respectively, of the distribution of  ˆ ()
j g β over all 
parameter draws.  Details on the formulae used to derive unconditional and conditional 
marginal effects after the tobit estimation can be found in Green (2000, Chapter 22). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
22 We do not evaluate marginal effects at sample means since this practice can lead to severely misleading 
results (see Train, 2003, pp. 33-34).  
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Appendix C. Further Robustness Checks 
 
We performed a number of checks in addition to those presented in the main text in order to 
ensure the consistency of our findings. First, about twenty percent of households answer 
“don’t know” to the question regarding the perceived average income of their peers and thus 
they are not used in our baseline regressions. To examine the sensitivity of our findings to the 
inclusion of these missing observations  we have re-estimated all our baseline models 
presented in Tables 2, 3, and 4 and add a flag dummy to denote households answering that 
they do not know the income of their peers.  For these observations the missing income of the 
peers is replaced by zeros. Estimated average marginal effects and associated standard errors 
for the income of the peers from this larger sample of households are presented in Table C.1. 
Notably, the estimated magnitudes across all specifications are very similar to those we 
estimate in our baseline models.  
 
Second, we experimented with different specifications that employ quartiles to model the 
income of the peers and our results are robust to such transformations. Our results are also 
insensitive to functional forms that use quartiles to model own income and/ or own financial 
and real wealth.  
 
Third, our modeling strategy of borrowing behavior is quite standard in household finance 
literature and it is in line with life-cycle portfolio models in which households decide each 
single period for the allocation of their resources and the amount of borrowing. Yet, one may 
argue that for many households that are observed in the data with collateralized loans 
outstanding in a given period, the decision to take up such loans (especially mortgages) is 
quite binding and has been typically made many years prior to the interview. To examine the 
sensitivity of our results to this issue,  we have re-estimated our probit model  for 
collateralized loans  focusing  only on  households that take up such loans (i.e., switch 
borrowing status) during the period covered by our data. Specifically, we use the sample of 
households without collateralized loans in 2001 (i.e., the initial observation period in our 
sample) and estimate the probability of taking up such a loan in any of the subsequent seven 
waves. This probit model conditions on the same set of covariates as the one used in our 
baseline specification (presented in Table 3). The estimated marginal effect on the income of 
the peers is 2  pp, significant at 1%, and contributes almost 20% to the unconditional 
probability of taking up a collateralized loan in this sample. Thus, estimated effects on the  
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income of the peers from this ‘inflow’ sample are economically important and relatively 
stronger to those we derive in our baseline specification. 
 
Fourth, one might argue that the estimated effects of income of the peers on collateralized 
loans are partly due to expectations about future housing market conditions. To that effect, 
we have estimated specifications of collateralized debt behavior that take into account, apart 
from peers’ income and expectations about next year’s own income, various expectations 
regarding future conditions in housing and mortgage markets. In particular, we take into 
account whether respondents expect housing prices to go up, whether they  anticipate an 
increase in mortgage interest rates, and whether they think that tax deductibility of mortgage 
interest rates will be limited in the future. Results (available upon request) suggest a 
significant negative relationship between an expected increase in mortgage interest rates and 
collateralized debt, but they do not affect our baseline findings regarding the significant role 
of income of peers or of expectations about next year’s own income (shown in Table 7, panel 
A). 
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Table C.1. Effects of Peer Income (taking into account ‘do not know’ responses). 
 
 
Note:  Selected marginal effects from probit regressions modeling the probability of having a loan and 
marginal effects from tobit regressions on the log amount of the loan outstanding conditional on having such 
loan. Reported marginal effects are based on a 12,000 euro annual increase of peer income. Specifications in 
panels A, B, and C condition on the same set of covariates used in the baseline specifications in Tables 2, 3, 
and 4, respectively, and a flag dummy denoting households that answer ‘do not know’ to the peer income 
question. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and clustered at the household level. ***,**,* 
denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
Marg. Eff.std. error Marg. Eff.std. error Marg. Eff.std. error
IHS(avg. peer income) 0.0256 0.0075 *** 0.0090 0.0039 ** 0.2796 0.1129 **
Log likelihood -3,414.9 -1,049.6 -1,892.7
Number of Observations 6,375 7,405 7,405
Marg. Eff.std. error Marg. Eff.std. error
IHS(avg. peer income) 0.0416 0.0081 *** 0.4713 0.0827 ***
Log likelihood -3,799.9 -14,480.5
Number of Observations 6,373 6,373
Marg. Eff.std. error Marg. Eff.std. error
IHS(avg. peer income) 0.0157 0.0056 *** 0.2307 0.0792 ***
Log likelihood -2,408.1 -7,679.6
Number of Observations 6,373 6,373
Pr(Consumer Loans>0)
E(log(Cons. Loans))|Cons. 
Loans>0
Panel A. Loans from Social Circle
Pr(perceived ability to 
borrow from social circle in 
the future>0)
Pr(Loans from social 
circle>0)
E(log(Loans from social 
circle))|Loans from social 
circle>0
Panel B. Collateralized Loans
Pr(Collateralized Loans>0)
E(log(Colat. Loans))|Colat. 
Loans>0
Panel C. Consumer Loans 
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Table D.1: Auxiliary Regressions
Age 0.0219 0.0041 *** 0.0217 0.0039 *** 0.0228 0.0042 *** 0.0164 0.0074 ** 0.0187 0.0070 *** 0.0171 0.0074 **
Age^2 -0.0002 0.0000 *** -0.0002 0.0000 *** -0.0002 0.0000 *** -0.0002 0.0001 ** -0.0002 0.0001 ** -0.0002 0.0001 **
Male -0.0162 0.0192 -0.0260 0.0182 -0.0177 0.0191 0.0434 0.0306 0.0217 0.0281 0.0404 0.0307
Couple 0.1841 0.0198 *** 0.1832 0.0191 *** 0.1824 0.0197 ***
Numb of Children 0.0102 0.0081 0.0125 0.0078 0.0104 0.0081 0.0131 0.0117 0.0154 0.0111 0.0124 0.0119
High School Education 0.2441 0.0232 *** 0.2469 0.0223 *** 0.2411 0.0234 *** 0.0853 0.0333 ** 0.0802 0.0315 ** 0.0836 0.0336 **
College Degree 0.4321 0.0255 *** 0.4353 0.0245 *** 0.4275 0.0257 *** 0.1218 0.0357 *** 0.1169 0.0333 *** 0.1215 0.0359 ***
Other Education 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2069 0.0950 ** 0.0000 0.0000 0.1966 0.0968 **
Employed 0.1141 0.0261 *** 0.1253 0.0246 *** 0.1145 0.0261 *** 0.0655 0.0366 * 0.0787 0.0339 ** 0.0631 0.0367 *
Self employed 0.1137 0.0574 ** 0.1102 0.0541 ** 0.1126 0.0574 ** 0.0554 0.0822 0.0844 0.0758 0.0599 0.0827
Retired 0.0653 0.0310 ** 0.0689 0.0285 ** 0.0672 0.0312 ** 0.0214 0.0505 0.0360 0.0461 0.0240 0.0510
Unemployed 0.1255 0.0617 ** 0.1196 0.0604 ** 0.1289 0.0619 ** 0.1270 0.0866 0.1295 0.0814 0.1255 0.0873
Last year income: unusually low -0.1352 0.0331 *** -0.1289 0.0315 *** -0.1330 0.0331 *** -0.1350 0.0558 ** -0.1365 0.0487 *** -0.1321 0.0555 **
Health poor/ fair -0.0272 0.0170 -0.0207 0.0160 -0.0258 0.0169 -0.0323 0.0248 -0.0324 0.0235 -0.0312 0.0247
IHS(net hh income)  0.0149 0.0029 *** 0.0129 0.0026 *** 0.0147 0.0029 *** 0.0176 0.0058 *** 0.0174 0.0053 *** 0.0177 0.0059 ***
IHS(net fin wealth) 0.0031 0.0011 *** 0.0028 0.0011 *** 0.0029 0.0011 *** 0.0045 0.0018 ** 0.0048 0.0017 *** 0.0045 0.0018 **
IHS(net real wealth) 0.0067 0.0017 *** 0.0074 0.0016 *** 0.0066 0.0017 *** 0.0062 0.0028 ** 0.0063 0.0025 ** 0.0063 0.0028 **
Percv. ability to borrow from social 
circle in the future
0.0324 0.0159 ** 0.0368 0.0249
Get advice from soc. circle -0.0014 0.0150 0.0120 0.0236
Regional dummies
Year dummies
Constant 9.7130 0.1136 *** 9.7379 0.1075 *** 9.6834 0.1165 *** 9.6186 0.2043 *** 9.5818 0.1937 *** 9.5922 0.2065 ***
(avg. peer Educat. - own 
Educat.)*Regional empl. % in h tech 0.0380 0.0026 *** 0.0390 0.0025 *** 0.0377 0.0026 ***
avg. peer Age (non fin. resp.) 0.0037 0.0020 * 0.0031 0.0019 0.0037 0.0020 *
avg. peer Education (non fin. resp.) 0.0381 0.0056 *** 0.0379 0.0053 *** 0.0372 0.0056 ***
F-statistic - instruments (p-value) 208.68 0.00 *** 250.80 0.00 *** 205.48 0.00 *** 23.65 0.00 *** 25.82 0.00 *** 22.69 0.00 ***
Number of Observations 4,363 4,899 4,362 1,339 1,545 1,339
- - -
-
-
yes
yes
-
-
yes
yes
yes
yes
-
-
yes
yes
yes
yes
-
-
yes
yes
IV 1 IV 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
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Table 1. Prevalence and Amount of Borrowing by Loan type 
 
 
 
Note: Weighted statistics from waves 2001-2008 of DNB data. Amounts refer to 
constant 2008 euro. 
 
 
 
Year Average 25th perc Median 75th perc
2001 30.45% 4.87% 15,212 1,583 2,771 15,832
2002 32.24% 4.96% 13,582 2,279 5,065 12,662
2003 29.68% 4.26% 12,010 1,391 3,241 15,689
2004 25.80% 3.92% 10,207 1,058 3,704 10,783
2005 28.12% 4.47% 7,976 1,098 2,196 7,320
2006 27.55% 3.73% 7,650 1,439 3,085 7,197
2007 25.99% 3.72% 8,488 1,829 3,810 7,112
2008 28.10% 3.49% 9,422 1,500 3,000 7,900
Total 28.31% 4.16% 10,638 1,519 3,313 10,282
Average 25th perc Median 75th perc
2001 37.81% 105,038 44,857 83,118 131,934
2002 43.22% 113,177 45,760 89,288 139,512
2003 43.12% 113,921 44,298 90,757 146,940
2004 40.96% 110,673 46,562 92,065 145,405
2005 41.25% 118,971 51,238 100,384 156,851
2006 40.69% 117,246 49,353 100,763 159,370
2007 41.02% 132,048 59,944 111,760 181,864
2008 40.92% 132,920 61,750 120,000 180,000
Total 41.15% 117,926 48,620 98,293 156,664
Average 25th perc Median 75th perc
2001 22.24% 11,451 956 4,486 11,610
2002 24.62% 9,448 843 4,659 12,344
2003 25.86% 13,030 918 4,415 13,487
2004 25.09% 11,315 835 4,021 11,794
2005 19.13% 14,957 1,045 4,273 12,548
2006 18.64% 11,267 853 4,138 12,287
2007 20.57% 11,196 889 3,835 11,379
2008 20.33% 12,008 680 3,750 11,206
Total 22.09% 11,793 875 4,181 12,155
Panel A. Loans from Social Circle
Panel C. Consumer Loans
Panel B. Collateralized Loans
Conditional amounts outstanding
Conditional amounts outstanding Prevalence 
(%)
Prevalence 
(%)
Perceived ability 
to borrow from 
social circle in 
the future (%)
Prevalence 
(%)
Conditional amounts outstanding 
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Table 2. Loans from Social Circle 
 
 
 
Note: Marginal effects from probit regressions modeling the probability of having an outstanding loan from friends 
and marginal effects from tobit regressions on the log amount of loan outstanding conditional on having such loan. All 
marginal effects have been averaged across households in the sample using survey weights.  The marginal effects for 
peer income are based on a 12,000 euro annual increase of the underlying variable. The marginal effects for household 
income, financial, and real wealth are calculated assuming a one standard deviation  increase of the underlying 
covariates. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and clustered at the household level. ***,**,* denote 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Marg. Eff. std. error Marg. Eff. std. error Marg. Eff. std. error
IHS(avg. peer income) 0.0225 0.0079 *** 0.0084 0.0040 ** 0.2653 0.1169 **
Age -0.0088 0.0009 *** -0.0016 0.0005 *** -0.0509 0.0165 ***
Male 0.0442 0.0219 ** 0.0043 0.0087 0.1467 0.2628
Couple 0.0352 0.0233 -0.0097 0.0113 -0.2920 0.3156
Numb of Children -0.0032 0.0110 -0.0015 0.0049 -0.0581 0.1499
High School Education 0.0698 0.0267 *** 0.0258 0.0119 ** 0.7756 0.3462 **
College Degree 0.0783 0.0262 *** 0.0070 0.0112 0.2473 0.3682
Other Education 0.2578 0.1181 ** 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Employed -0.0053 0.0323 0.0126 0.0113 0.3841 0.3433
Self employed 0.0313 0.0533 0.0518 0.0315 1.4181 0.7126 **
Retired -0.0584 0.0342 * -0.0005 0.0148 -0.0254 0.4845
Unemployed -0.1210 0.0519 ** -0.0035 0.0214 -0.1968 0.6611
Last year income: unusually low -0.0787 0.0301 *** 0.0325 0.0186 * 0.8419 0.4174 **
Health poor/ fair -0.0472 0.0202 ** -0.0026 0.0097 -0.1001 0.2979
IHS(net hh income)  0.0025 0.0042 0.0003 0.0017 0.0083 0.0530
IHS(net fin wealth) 0.0248 0.0068 *** -0.0141 0.0031 *** -0.6676 0.1274 ***
IHS(net real wealth) 0.0052 0.0071 0.0055 0.0038 0.1733 0.1101
Regional dummies
Year dummies
Log likelihood -2,529.6 -820.2 -1,502.4
Number of Observations 4,524 5,074 5,074
IHS(avg. peer income) 0.0878 0.0267 ***
F-statistic from Auxilliary Regression (p-value) 208.68 0.00 *** 250.80 0.00 *** 250.80 0.00 ***
Exogeneity Test (p-value) 6.08 0.01 ** 1.25 0.26 1.39 0.24
Number of Observations 4,363 4,899 4,899
IHS(avg. peer income) 0.1677 0.0406 ***
F-statistic from Auxilliary Regression (p-value) 23.65 0.00 *** 25.82 0.00 *** 25.82 0.00 ***
Sargan Hansen Test for overidentificat. (p-value) 0.37 0.55 4.99 0.03 ** 4.99 0.03 **
Exogeneity Test (p-value) 6.83 0.01 *** 2.04 0.15 2.04 0.15
Number of Observations 1,339 1,545 1,545
Probit Tobit
IV 2
IV 1
Pr(perceived ability to 
borrow from social circle in 
the future>0)
Pr(Loans from social 
circle>0)
yes yes
yes yes
E(log(Loans from soc. 
circle))|Loans from soc. 
circle>0
yes
yes 
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Table 3. Collateralized Loans 
 
 
 
Note: Marginal effects from probit regressions modeling the probability of having an outstanding collateralized 
loan and marginal effects from tobit regressions on the log amount of collateralized loan outstanding conditional 
on having such loan. See notes in Table 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
Marg. Eff. std. error Marg. Eff. std. error
IHS(avg. peer income) 0.0444 0.0085 *** 0.4984 0.0862 ***
Age -0.0016 0.0011 -0.0280 0.0119 **
Male 0.0001 0.0249 -0.0007 0.2959
Couple 0.1709 0.0266 *** 1.8652 0.2661 ***
Numb of Children 0.0126 0.0122 0.1059 0.1192
High School Education 0.0205 0.0291 0.2296 0.3182
College Degree 0.0728 0.0299 ** 0.8510 0.3338 **
Other Education 0.0199 0.1477 0.3260 1.8588
Employed 0.0807 0.0342 ** 0.8935 0.3551 **
Self employed 0.0894 0.0567 1.0961 0.5685 *
Retired 0.0312 0.0386 0.5009 0.4379
Unemployed 0.0122 0.0723 0.1606 0.8299
Last year income: unusually low -0.0977 0.0360 *** -1.2901 0.3688 ***
Health poor/ fair -0.0104 0.0231 -0.1803 0.2347
IHS(net hh income)  0.0138 0.0042 *** 0.1387 0.0366 ***
IHS(net fin wealth) 0.0024 0.0066 0.0500 0.0601
IHS(net real wealth) 0.0709 0.0092 *** 0.3858 0.0540 ***
Perceived ability to borrow from soc. circle in the future 0.0091 0.0210 0.0149 0.2219
Get advice from soc. circle -0.0296 0.0191 -0.4001 0.2152 *
Regional dummies
Year dummies
Log likelihood -2,686.2 -10,412.3
Number of Observations 4,523 4,523
F-statistic from Auxilliary Regression (p-value) 205.48 0.00 *** 205.48 0.00 ***
Exogeneity Test (p-value) 2.12 0.15 2.06 0.15
Number of Observations 4,362 4,362
F-statistic from Auxilliary Regression (p-value) 22.69 0.00 *** 22.69 0.00 ***
Sargan Hansen Test for overidentification (p-value) 0.17 0.50 0.17 0.50
Exogeneity Test (p-value) 1.92 0.17 1.92 0.17
Number of Observations 1,339 1,339
IV 2
Pr(Collateralized Loans>0)
E(log(Colat. Loans))|Colat. 
Loans>0
Probit Tobit
IV 1
yes yes
yes yes 
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Table 4. Consumer Loans 
 
 
 
Note: Marginal effects from probit regressions modeling the probability of having a consumer loan and marginal 
effects from tobit regressions on the log amount of consumer loan outstanding conditional on having such loan. 
See notes in Table 2. 
 
 
 
 
Marg. Eff. std. error Marg. Eff. std. error
IHS(avg. peer income) 0.0158 0.0058 *** 0.2385 0.0810 ***
Age -0.0021 0.0007 *** -0.0276 0.0095 ***
Male 0.0107 0.0157 0.2180 0.1916
Couple 0.0562 0.0160 *** 0.6868 0.2313 ***
Numb of Children 0.0001 0.0071 0.0323 0.1008
High School Education 0.0175 0.0187 0.2084 0.2572
College Degree 0.0137 0.0200 0.0965 0.2634
Other Education 0.1243 0.0919 1.0343 0.9973
Employed 0.0164 0.0203 0.0757 0.2563
Self employed 0.0296 0.0349 0.1830 0.4699
Retired 0.0033 0.0266 -0.1311 0.4001
Unemployed 0.0475 0.0523 0.5328 0.5808
Last year income: unusually low 0.0726 0.0307 ** 0.8331 0.2996 ***
Health poor/ fair 0.0230 0.0144 0.2769 0.1937
IHS(net hh income)  0.0042 0.0032 0.0808 0.0484 *
IHS(net fin wealth) -0.1962 0.0042 *** -3.4979 0.0535 ***
IHS(net real wealth) 0.0018 0.0051 0.0073 0.0887
Perceived ability to borrow from soc. circle in the future -0.0098 0.0141 -0.1470 0.1798
Get advice from soc. circle -0.0262 0.0126 ** -0.3693 0.1707 **
Regional dummies
Year dummies
Log likelihood -1,692.0 -5,443.1
Number of Observations 4,523 4,523
F-statistic from Auxilliary Regression (p-value) 205.48 0.00 *** 205.48 0.00 ***
Exogeneity Test (p-value) 0.40 0.53 0.65 0.42
Number of Observations 4,362 4,362
F-statistic from Auxilliary Regression (p-value) 22.69 0.00 *** 22.69 0.00 ***
Sargan Hansen Test for overidentification (p-value) 1.28 0.26 1.28 0.26
Exogeneity Test (p-value) 0.00 0.97 0.00 0.97
Number of Observations 1,339 1,339
IV 1
IV 2
yes yes
Probit Tobit
Pr(Consumer Loans>0) E(log(Cons. Loans))|Cons. 
Loans>0
yes yes 
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Table 5. Placebo Regressions 
 
Note: Selected marginal effects from probit regressions modeling the probability of having a formal loan and marginal effects from 
tobit regressions on the log amount of the loan outstanding conditional on having such loan. Peer income is that of a randomly 
assigned household belonging to the same year, age, education, gender cell as the respondent’s social circle. The marginal effects for 
peer income are based on a 12,000 euro annual increase of the underlying variable. Specifications in panel A (panel B) condition on 
the same set of covariates used in the baseline specifications in Table 3 (Table 4). Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity 
and clustered at the household level. ***,**,* denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Marg. Eff. std. error Marg. Eff. std. error
IHS(avg. peer income) -0.0061 0.0057 -0.0031 0.0710
Marg. Eff. std. error Marg. Eff. std. error
IHS(avg. peer income) -0.0025 0.0043 0.2340 0.1979
Pr(Consumer Loans>0)
E(log(Cons. Loans))|Cons. 
Loans>0
Panel A. Collateralized Loans
Panel B. Consumer Loans
Pr(Collateralized Loans>0)
E(log(Colat. Loans))|Colat. 
Loans>0 
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Table 6. Asymmetric Effects of Peer Income 
 
Note: Selected marginal effects from probit regressions modeling the probability of having a loan and marginal effects from tobit regressions on the log 
amount of the loan outstanding conditional on having such loan. Presented marginal effects are based on a 12,000 euro annual increase of peer income. 
Specifications in panels A, B, and C condition on the same set of covariates used in the baseline specifications in Tables 2, 3, and 4, respectively. Standard 
errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and clustered at the household level. ***,**,* denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Marg. Eff. std. error Marg. Eff. std. error Marg. Eff.std. error
IHS(own income)-IHS(avg. peer income)>0 0.0116 0.0054 ** 0.0009 0.0023 0.0254 0.0654
IHS(own income)-IHS(avg. peer income)<0 0.0111 0.0045 ** 0.0062 0.0024 *** 0.2056 0.0692 ***
Marg. Eff. std. error Marg. Eff.std. error
IHS(own income)-IHS(avg. peer income)>0 -0.0041 0.0060 -0.0054 0.0682
IHS(own income)-IHS(avg. peer income)<0 0.0366 0.0052 *** 0.3184 0.0423 ***
Marg. Eff. std. error Marg. Eff.std. error
IHS(own income)-IHS(avg. peer income)>0 0.0034 0.0037 0.0516 0.0531
IHS(own income)-IHS(avg. peer income)<0 0.0104 0.0033 *** 0.1642 0.0494 ***
Pr(Consumer Loans>0)
Pr(perceived ability to 
borrow from social circle in 
the future>0)
Pr(Loans from social circle>0)
E(log(Loans from social 
circle))|Loans from social 
circle>0
E(log(Cons. Loans))|Cons. 
Loans>0
Panel A. Loans from Social Circle
Panel B. Collateralized Loans
Panel C. Consumer Loans
Pr(Collateralized Loans>0)
E(log(Colat. Loans))|Colat. 
Loans>0 
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Table 7.  Living Standards, Perceived Ability of the Social Circle to Spend, and Expected Future Own Income 
 
Note: Selected marginal effects from probit regressions modeling the probability of having a formal loan and marginal effects from tobit 
regressions on the log amount of the loan outstanding conditional on having such loan. The marginal effects for peer income are based 
on a 12,000 euro annual increase of the underlying variable. The marginal effects for average sq. meters of friends, own square meters, 
and expected income next period are calculated assuming a one SD increase of the underlying covariates. Specifications in panel A 
(panel B) also condition on the set of covariates used in the baseline specifications in Table 3 (Table 4). Standard errors are corrected for 
heteroscedasticity and clustered at the household level. ***,**,* denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Marg. Eff. std. error Marg. Eff. std. error
IHS(avg. peer income) 0.0352 0.0088 *** 0.4097 0.0906 ***
Avg sq. meters of friends 0.0215 0.0104 ** 0.2841 0.1244 **
Own sq. meters 0.0423 0.0172 ** 0.3796 0.1337 ***
IHS(perceived lower bound on next period’s income) 0.0452 0.0128 *** 0.4828 0.1267 ***
Log likelihood -2,436.4 -9,875.9
Number of Observations 4,206 4,206
Marg. Eff. std. error Marg. Eff. std. error
IHS(avg. peer income) 0.0127 0.0061 ** 0.1838 0.0881 **
Soc. circle has more money to spend than I 0.0123 0.0049 ** 0.1820 0.0633 ***
IHS(perceived lower bound on next period’s income) 0.0012 0.0092 0.0258 0.1313
Log likelihood -1,361.9 -4,443.3
Number of Observations 3,669 3,669
Prob(Consumer credit>0) E(log(Cons. credit))|Cons. credit>0
Probit Tobit
Panel B. Consumer Loans
Panel A. Collateralized Loans
Prob(Collateralized Debt>0) E(log(Colat. Debt))|Colat. Debt>0
Probit Tobit 
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Table 8. Peer Income and Over-indebtedness 
 
 
Note: Marginal effects from tobit regressions on measures of financial distress. All marginal effects 
have been averaged across households in the sample using survey weights.  The marginal effects for 
peer income are based on a 12,000 euro annual increase of the underlying variable. The marginal 
effects for household income, financial, and real wealth are calculated assuming a one standard 
deviation increase of the underlying covariates. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and 
clustered at the household level. ***,**,* denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
 
 
Marg. Eff. std. error Marg. Eff. std. error
IHS(avg. peer income) 0.0371 0.0058 *** 0.0102 0.0034 ***
Age -0.0040 0.0008 *** -0.0005 0.0005
Male -0.0044 0.0174 0.0103 0.0102
Couple 0.1115 0.0175 *** 0.0267 0.0102 ***
Numb of Children 0.0092 0.0075 0.0008 0.0043
High School Education 0.0011 0.0188 0.0202 0.0109 *
College Degree 0.0434 0.0190 ** 0.0301 0.0116 ***
Other Education 0.0547 0.1228 0.0457 0.0797
Employed 0.0707 0.0206 *** 0.0363 0.0149 **
Self employed 0.0911 0.0370 ** 0.0263 0.0240
Retired 0.0467 0.0254 * 0.0202 0.0162
Unemployed 0.0158 0.0474 0.0326 0.0303
Last year income: unusually low -0.0933 0.0207 *** -0.0478 0.0115 ***
Health poor/ fair -0.0161 0.0142 -0.0082 0.0082
IHS(net hh income)  0.0106 0.0030 *** 0.0172 0.0017 ***
IHS(net fin wealth) 0.0103 0.0051 ** 0.0015 0.0025
IHS(net real wealth) -0.0037 0.0067 0.0218 0.0037 ***
Perceived ability to borrow from soc. circle in the future -0.0096 0.0125 -0.0033 0.0082
Get advice from soc. circle -0.0310 0.0135 ** -0.0096 0.0079
Regional dummies
Year dummies
Log likelihood -3,144.8 -1,801.0
Number of Observations 4,504 3,722
F-statistic from Auxilliary Regression (p-value) 205.85 0.00 *** 196.53 0.00 ***
Exogeneity Test (p-value) 1.48 0.22 0.24 0.62
Number of Observations 4,331 3,578
F-statistic from Auxilliary Regression (p-value) 22.65 0.00 *** 21.79 0.00 ***
Sargan Hansen Test for overidentification (p-value) 0.95 0.33 0.59 0.44
Exogeneity Test (p-value) 1.13 0.29 0.11 0.74
Number of Observations 1,331 948
IV 2
E(Loan to Value Ratio) E(Debt Servicing Ratio)
Tobit Tobit
IV 1
yes yes
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